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CHAPTER 11: 
The Fall Crisis 
at Eastern 
by Paul J. Baicich 
After most of the articles in this issue were written, covering 
events leading up to the March strike deadline and the subse-
quent signing of the IAM-Eastern contract, labor-management 
relations at Eastern once again became volatile in the Fall. We 
asked Paul Baicich, a shop steward at IAM Local Lodge 796 in 
Washington, D.C., to write about these more recent events. An 
earlier version of this article appeared in Labor Notes (No. 57, 
Oct. 26, 1983). 
When the IAM's contract with Eastern was ratified on April 8, 
membership morale and self-confidence were at a high point. But 
labor relations in the airline industry as a whole were bad and getting 
worse. 
The lockout of west coast IAM members working for Quantas Air-
ways continued without a break. Quantas had hired an anti-union 
consulting firm and had contracted-out all of the IAM work the 
previous February. Other "flag carriers/' such as Japan Airlines, Lan 
Chile and Iberia, were following a similar pattern of negotiations. 
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At Frontier Airlines, Chairman Glen Ryland announced that he 
intended to spin off a non-union subsidiary airline in the fall. The 
new carrier, to be called "Frontier Horizon, Inc." would fly new routes 
with workers earning at least 30% less in wages and benefits than 
those at competing airlines. At Western Airlines, where employees 
have accepted pay cuts for the last few years, management insisted 
again that the workers accept further reductions in pay. The unions 
there agreed to accept 10% pay cuts for one year in exchange for an 
employee stock and profit-sharing plan. At Republic, after looking 
at the books, the unions agreed to a 15% pay cut for nine months. 
At Continental, the IAM was forced into a strike on August 13th 
by a management which insisted on contract language that could 
eliminate the entire IAM workforce by allowing the company to 
contract out "any and all work." Months prior to the strike, Cont-
inental began to train hundreds of flight attendants and mechanics 
for strike-breaking. The leadership and membership of District 146 
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of the LAM were caught off guard; many members crossed the picket 
lines, including some who had been on the negotiating committee. 
Against this background, the September-October crisis at Eastern 
appeared ominous. 
On September 19th, Eastern management withdrew its previous 
contract offers in its negotiations with the flight attendants, 
represented by the Transport Workers Union (TWU), and presented 
an unacceptable ultimatum. The company demanded a pay cut of 
15% effective November 1 to be followed by another cut of 5% effect-
ive January 1; a vacation reduction of 20% parting in 1984; a dual 
scale for wages and vacation for old employees and new hires; an 
increase in employee-paid medical insurance costs, and a series of 
unsatisfactory work rule changes. Similar demands were also made 
to all of Eastern's other employees—union and non-union. The 
deadline for compliance with these demands was October 12th, the 
day before the flight attendants' strike deadline. 
The fact that this ultimatum dovetailed with the TWU strike 
deadline put added pressure on the flight attendants and was clearly 
intended to intimidate District 100 of the IAM, which had pledged 
to honor any TWU picket lines. Could Frank Borman make a "clean 
sweep" on the morning of the 13th and eliminate much of the union 
presence at Eastern? 
The Air Lines Pilots Association (ALPA) at Eastern and District 100 
were, of course, not in negotiations at the time and thus these two 
unions were caught somewhat unprepared when this ultimatum was 
made. The Master Executive Council of ALPA at Eastern agreed that 
the company was in an unhealthy financial situation, but refused 
to give any more concessions until top-level management at Eastern 
was replaced. The Machinists were more skeptical of the company's 
financial contentions, pointing to Merrill Lynch's recommendation 
on September 13th that the company would be profitable in 1984, 
earning $2.70 a share. 1985 and 1986 earnings per share were 
projected to be between $4.00 and $5.00. The company, however, was 
pointing to a $106 million loss between January and July, and manage-
ment claimed the company would have to shut down unless the 
employees made concessions. Then news from Continental Airlines 
rocked the industry. 
Continental Airlines on September 24th declared that it was going 
to close its doors and reopen a few days later as the "New Continental 
Airlines" under Chapter 11 protection of the bankruptcy code. 
Continental's move was seen by the unions as clearly a way to get 
out from under labor contracts and a way to break all the unions 
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on the property. Indeed, Continental Chairman Frank Lorenzo was 
quoted in the Wall Street Journal of September 26th as saying, "It 
wasn't a problem of (insufficient) cash... Our sole problem was 
labor." The flight attendants and pilots at Continental declared a strike 
and joined District 146 Machinists on the picket line. Continental 
management cut service from 78 cities down to 25 and reduced the 
pay of remaining workers by 50%. Continental's abbreviated 
schedule, use of scabs and new hires kept it flying on a wobbly 
course. 
At Eastern, Borman played up the Continental Chapter 11 events 
like a virtuoso. Previous to this, a Chapter 11 threat was implied. 
Now that option, and all that it meant, became explicit. The 
company's propaganda machine, dormant since the spring, was in 
motion again. A videotape with Borman made the rounds at all the 
stations. Employees received letters from corporate headquarters in 
Miami stating that wage and benefits concessions are "the only real 
option we have." Management encouraged union members to tell 
their elected leadership that they wanted "to vote" on the company's 
ultimatum. 
A number of flight attendants broke ranks and urged acceptance 
of Borman's demands. But TWU leadership and rank-and-file activists 
held fast. Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations took place 
at airports and ticket offices. In Boston, labor delegates attending 
an AFLrCIO meeting joined 80 irate Eastern Airlines flight attendants 
picketing the ticket office there. In Atlanta, LAM members passed 
the hat and hired a skywriter to write "Frank Borman, Resign Now!" 
above the heads of participants in a pro-Borman rally. In Miami, the 
LAM pulled-off one of its successful lunch-hour protests, reminiscent 
of those which occurred during the last crisis. This time a number 
of flight attendants and pilots bolstered the IAM's ranks. 
The District made clear that Frank Borman was the problem and 
that he should not be allowed to remain the head of Eastern Airlines. 
Once again the LAM pledged to honor TWU picket lines if a con-
tract was not agreed to between the TWU and Eastern, whatever the 
consequences. Captain Henry Duffy, ALPA President, recommend-
ed that the pilots not give in to any further demands from manage-
ment and even threatened a nation-wide pilots' strike in response 
to the situation in the industry. 
The effort to frighten the union workers into submission at Eastern 
was not working very well. If anything it backfired doubly: thousands 
of reservations were cancelled and many more were never made 
because of the bad publicity. The LAM accused Eastern management 
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of being its own worst enemy 
and of creating an economic self-
fulfilling prophecy with its scare 
tactics. (District 100 estimated 
that in the previous 14-16 
months, strike and shutdown 
threats cost Eastern in the 
neighborhood of $200 million-
all due to bad management.) 
Clearly, Borman had to try 
another method to get the 
unions to submit. 
William Usery, former 
Secretary of Labor under Presi-
dent Ford (and once a Grand 
Lodge Representative for the 
IAM), was brought on board by 
Borman to help run interference 
for the company. The IAM's 
original openness to Usery 
ended almost overnight. Usery 
asked the investment banking 
firm of Lazard Freres to conduct 
what he termed an "independent 
audit." District 100 blasted that 
attempt because it claimed that 
Lazard Freres was in no way 
"independent/' President Bryan 
disclosed a number of facts to 
back up this contention, including the following: 
• Felix Rohatyn, general and leading partner of Lazard Freres, 
served on EAL's Board of Directors from May 1977 through 
November 1980. 
• Lazard Freres, in 1976, was brought in to restructure Eastern's 
debt and introduced the first pay concessions—the variable 
earnings program. 
• Rohatyn reported when he was on the board at Eastern that 
Lazard had received $2 million for services it provided 
Eastern from 1977 through 1979. 
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President Bryan made clear that the District would not trust "the 
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self-serving report from a firm which has an established dependency 
on the economy of EAL and which has played a leadership role in 
the plans of EAL employee concessions in the past eight years." Bryan 
went on to demand the retention of the firm Locker-Abrecht to review 
all corporate information necessary to establish "a true and accurate 
picture of the financial status of Eastern Airlines." 
A few days later the company gave in. Eastern agreed to settle the 
labor dispute with the flight attendants and to rescind the threat of 
bankruptcy. The three major unions and management at Eastern 
agreed to have Lazard Freres and Locker-Abrecht jointly perform an 
analysis of the status and prospects of the company. The study by 
Lazard Freres and Locker-Abrecht, once finished, would be the basis 
for further discussions on getting the company on firmer financial 
footing. The three unions did not agree on any form of pay conces-
sions, cuts or reductions—just discussions. 
The Lazard Freres and Locker-Abrecht analysis will not be released 
without the agreement of all four parties—the three unions and the 
company. But judging from what the LAM has recently advocated, 
one can assume at least a few points will emerge. The District is not 
simply looking at numbers on the balance sheet. The leadership 
insists on uncovering causes, not just the effects. Remedies for the 
company will surely include challenging major management 
decisions that the District has opposed in the past. When considering 
the area of possible pay cuts or concessions, however, the District 
leadership in general and Charlie Bryan in particular have indicated 
that any "give-backs" in the area of wages will be voluntary and will 
be linked to a "loan program" which will guarantee return and 
interest, such as the IBA. 
There is no long-term guarantee of victory here—that would entail 
an industry-wide union effort to challenge Chapter 11, deregulation 
and corporate union-busting. But District 100 did the right things. 
The vital spadework—research, education and mobilization done for 
negotiations in the past—paid off again in the September-October 
crisis and kept Borman at bay. 
And there is reason to be hopeful. Cooperation among unions in 
the airline industry today is greater than ever before. ALPA Presi-
dent Duffy said that the situations at Continental and Eastern created 
an atmosphere in which his members are "finally learning the 
meaning of the most central word in the labor movement—solidarity." 
• 
